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The threat of degradation or disruption from cyber 
infiltration, espionage, and theft to militarily and 
nationally critical information and network systems poses a 
significant challenge to DoD and DON. To mitigate this 
challenge, network administrators must be trained to 
properly recognize and defend against malicious activity. 
The Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST), a 
software program under development at NPS, mimics the 
behavior and impact of network-based malware in an effort 
to train the administrators of operational DoD networks 
both to respond to the threats such materials present to 
their networks and to assess their competence in 
recognizing and responding to such threats.  
In order for MAST to achieve its potential as an 
acceptable assessment and training tool, it must first be 
shown to present no new threat to the environment for which 
it was designed. This thesis develops a step-by-step 
testing procedure, the execution of which will demonstrate 
that MAST can perform at a level commensurate with current 
criteria for operating securely on DoD networks. 
Additionally, this thesis discusses the quantitative 
testing environment and current testing and implementation 
methods and criteria for new cyber hardware and software 
programs of record in the DoD. 
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Establishing trust in Department of Defense (DoD) 
network durability against attack, and actively maintaining 
that trust, is crucial to the success of networked 
operations. Such operations are the heart of DoD doctrine. 
It is a reality of 21st-centry warfare that a variety of 
cyber activities from varying sources can compromise 
security and adversely affect a command, platform, the 
Navy, or DoD as a whole.  
The activities that leverage these system 
vulnerabilities can be intentional or unintentional. 
Intentional exploits are those that are targeted and 
untargeted attacks from any malicious actor, be it a state, 
criminal organization, or individual. An example of an 
unintentional vulnerability is one that is caused by 
failure to follow proper network security procedures, such 
as installing software upgrades or patches [1]. Targeted 
actions against networks are potentially devastating, 
because the targeted attack is more likely intended to 
exploit known vulnerabilities. It is especially 
disheartening if the exploit takes advantage of 
vulnerabilities for which there are existing solutions [2]. 
The potential impact of these vulnerabilities is 
amplified by the connectivity between systems, the 
Internet, and the Global Information Grid (GIG), providing 
the adversary an avenue of approach. The Navy and DoD 
continue to move to networked operations, increasing the 
exposure of cyber vulnerabilities to potential exploits and 
malicious activities. 
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In February 2011, the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) testified that in the previous year 
there had been a dramatic increase in malicious cyber 
activity targeting U.S. computers and networks, including a 
more than tripling of the volume of malicious software 
since 2009 [3]. 
Recently, both civilian and military leaders have 
emphasized the “increase in cyber threats and 
vulnerabilities, making it imperative to act with urgency 
and purpose to protect the cyber domain from crippling 
attacks and disruptions.” [4]  
The threat of degradation or disruption from cyber 
infiltration, espionage, and theft to militarily and 
nationally critical information and network systems is 
real. However, it is possible to be cognizant of the threat 
and work to close vulnerabilities in the cyber domain and 
begin hardening of national and DoD network assets while 
avoiding the pitfalls of threat inflation [5].  
To address these threats and vulnerabilities, it is 
important to have well-trained personnel capable of 
protecting Navy and DoD networks. The Malicious Activity 
Simulation Tool  (MAST) has been developed incrementally by 
several Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students (Taff and 
Salevski [6], Neff [7], Hammond [8], Longoria [9], Belli 
[10], and Lowney [11]), as a tool for training Navy and DoD 
network administrators in the recognition and removal of 
malware and malicious activities, thus better enabling them 
to defend DoD networks.  
For MAST to achieve its potential as an acceptable 
assessment and training tool, it must first be shown to 
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introduce no new vulnerabilities and present no new threats 
to the environment for which it was designed. This 
requirement serves as the motivation for this thesis. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Malicious Activity Simulation Tool is a software 
program under development at NPS that mimics the behavior 
and impact of various malware in a network and creates an 
environment for training network administrators. Trainees 
learn to respond to the threats malware presents to their 
networks and their competence in recognizing and responding 
to such threats can be assessed. A key element of MAST is 
its use of Simware - malware mimics that simulate malware 
behavior (see Definitions, Ch IV). Simware looks and 
behaves like real malware except that it does not cause the 
damage that real malware would [6, 8, 10, 11]. Because 
Simware is safe to use, it can be used for training on live 
computer networks.  
Before fielding MAST on operational networks, thorough 
testing of the system must be performed in accordance with 
Navy directives. “At a minimum, new equipment must be 
laboratory tested to preclude degradation of operational 
networks during … operations.” [12] The same instruction 
also cites the need for new programs to be capable of 
interoperation with legacy systems. This thesis describes a 
methodology for validating both that MAST precludes 
degradation to operational networks during operations, and 
that it is capable of interoperation with legacy systems. 
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B. OBJECTIVES 
Following the mantra that “a safe system will do what 
you want it to, but a secure system will only do what you 
want it to” [13] this thesis seeks to go beyond the mere 
functionality testing of MAST. The overarching objective of 
this thesis is to develop a step-by-step testing procedure, 
the execution of which will demonstrate that MAST can 
perform at a level commensurate with current criteria for 
operating securely on DoD networks. 
The MAST Testing Group (see Definitions, Ch II) will 
face the challenge of clearing a program for operation on a 
DoD network whose purpose is to simulate activities that 
are normally screened out in the testing process. [6] 
Demonstrating that a program induces infection-like 
behavior in a network during testing is traditionally 
grounds for failure and removal until said behavior is 
fixed. In contrast, replicating the conduct of malware is 
the purpose of MAST. Therefore, in order for it to be 
considered safe for implementation on an operational 
network, it must first be demonstrated that MAST will not 
degrade network operations when it is installed and 
executed on a cyber test range network. That is, it must be 
shown that, while it mimics the behavior of malicious 
software, its activity does not result in the actual 
behavior of the malware it mimics. 
Following demonstrating that MAST can be safely 
installed and executed on a range, individual Simware 
modules will be tested. Simware modules are the portions of 
MAST that specifically simulate malicious activity. The 
effects of a Simware module can be either visible to the 
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user, such as slowing of a client’s processor, or 
invisible, such as a port scan or ping [14]. 
The specified nefarious behavior of an individual 
Simware module must be shown to be the only malicious 
activity exhibited while executing that module; accurately 
replicating or demonstrating only what is expected to be 
seen.  
Finally, operation of the kill switch (see 
Definitions, Ch IV) must be proven to roll back (see 
Definitions, Ch IV) the Simware module, resetting the 
testing network to its previous state and placing MAST in 
an idle state where it exhibits no negative impact to the 
environment for which it was designed.   
Testing the functionality of MAST, i.e., verifying 
whether or not the program does indeed perform the 
functions that it should, is outside the scope of this 
thesis, as functionality testing has already been 
completed. The scope herein is limited to demonstrating 
MAST can interoperate securely on a cyber range test 
network while performing the functions and operations that 
it should perform. 
C. ORGANIZATION  
The remainder of this document proceeds as follows: 
Chapter II provides the reader a brief history of 
MAST, furnishing information on the evolution from its 
beginnings as a Malware Mimic (MM) to MAST as it exists 
today. Chapter II also offers a glimpse into the expected 
direction of the next wave of students and their plans for 
MAST in the near future. Further, it provides definitions 
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to lay the framework for terminology that will be used 
throughout this document. 
An additional feature of Chapter II is the program 
definition that it provides, so that the historical 
direction of MAST is reconciled with the direction in which 
it is now heading. 
Chapter III examines the quantitative testing 
environment and current testing and implementation methods 
and criteria for new cyber hardware and software programs 
of record (PORs) in the DoD. This is captured through 
discussion of DoD cyber ranges, the backbone networks and 
software suites utilized by the Department of the Navy 
(DON), and the security system that is currently employed. 
Chapter IV describes the step-by-step quantitative 
testing process for MAST software that satisfies the 
primary objective set out in this chapter thereby 
addressing the problem statement. 
Chapter V highlights the key contributions of the 
thesis and provides concluding thoughts of work herein. It 
also expounds on the expectations of the quantitative 
testing procedure and looks at future possibilities or 
areas of study for the Malicious Activity Simulation Tool. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides specific definitions of terms 
relevant to this research and the quantitative testing 
process to ensure clarity of intended meaning. 
Additionally, a brief review of the history of MAST is 
performed to provide the necessary background information 
and to consolidate the direction in which MAST proceeds. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
For the purpose of clarity, those terms that are 
necessary to a background understanding of MAST are 
discussed here. 
1. Testing Group 
This term refers to the individuals who will be 
performing the test of MAST outlined in Chapter IV of this 
thesis. 
2. Red Team 
Red teams are “specially selected groups designed to 
anticipate and simulate the decision-making and behaviors 
of potential adversaries.” [15] A Red Team is employed to 
test an organization or entity and determine its resilience 
against a particular threat or attack. As the term refers 
to network security testing, Red Teams engage in 
penetration testing to determine if network administrators 
utilize proper network hardening measures [15]. 
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3. Penetration Testing 
Penetration testing is “a method of actively 
evaluating the security of an information system or network 
by simulating an attack from a malicious source.” [1] 
Penetration testing can include any or all of the 
following: network reconnaissance/footprinting; network 
scanning; enumeration; gaining and/or maintaining access to 
a network [1].  
4. Network Hardening  
This is the process of eliminating as many security 
risks to a network as possible in order to reduce the level 
of vulnerability to threats. 
5. Malicious Behavior 
Computer network activities whose execution may 
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability 
of friendly computer networks and the information they 
process [1]. 
Some examples include but are not limited to, network 
reconnaissance, data exfiltration or modification, and 
denial of service (DoS). 
B. MAST HISTORICAL SUMMARY 
This section provides a brief history of MAST from its 
conception to its current construct. 
1. The First Wave: Taff/Salevski  
The original groundwork for MAST is laid out in 
Malware Mimics for Network Security Assessment, a thesis by 
William Taff and Paul Salevski [6].  
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Taff and Salevski’s motivation for this project was to 
“positively impact national security by improving training 
for network administrators through the use of a distributed 
software system.” [6] They attempted to replicate what they 
described as the actions of a “highly trained adversary,” a 
scope that was later refined to focus on malware, such as 
worms, viruses, and Trojan horses. This replication they 
sought to accomplish through their MM Software and 
architecture. They limited their scope to malware – worms, 
viruses, etc., choosing not to discuss human-centric 
behavior though they left open the possibility of the “MM-
System” expanding to include that wider range of scenarios 
[6]. 
a. Purpose: 
The purpose of the MM Software was to duplicate 
Navy Red Team’s “effective, realistic, and comprehensive 
training for network administrators.” [6] Taff and Salevski 
understood that Red Teams do not perform “training” by 
definition, rather they sought to replicate the training 
value that Red Team’s penetration testing provides for 
network administrators. The statement, “Exercises [versus] 
a Red Team are the pinnacle of a unit’s training” [6] 
offers an explanation of the use of the word “training”, 
that is: the context in which the Red Team is attacking, 
Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), is one of 
“training”. 
b. Objective: 
Taff and Salevski’s objective was to design a 
network administrator training tool [6] that was: 
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• Safe enough for use on an operational 
network, and not constrained to use in the 
laboratory 
• Able to emulate threat behaviors rather than 
duplicating the threats themselves 
• Distributed, allowing for execution from a 
location geographically separated from the 
network and network administrators 
undergoing training 
c. Implementation:  
Taff and Salevski devoted Chapter IV of their 
thesis to describing the creation of the MM-Server and MM-
Clients that would become their training tool [6]. They 
covered sever construction; client construction; 
communication protocols; and server Graphic User Interface 
(GUI) design. 
They tested the MM on a virtual (VMware) network 
containing two MM servers and 20 MM client nodes. The 
tests/experiments had the following objectives: 
• Verify that the machines could be controlled 
[reset] in a timely fashion and that MM-
Clients would generate an externally 
observable network behavior [6] 
• Verify the MM-Server and MM-Client software 
could work on Windows and Linux environments 
– this was to ensure that the code worked on 
the common platforms within the DoD and 
prove the MM-Client’s portability between 
the various Operating Systems (OS) [6] 
d. Results: 
The MM Software: 
“functioned as it was designed, with feedback 
between the MM-Server and the MM-Clients. The 
safety features were adequate in restoring the 
MM-Clients to their failsafe state during 
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interruptions in network connections with their 
respective MM-Sever. Observable network traffic 
was positively identified [that could] fulfill 
training and analysis objectives.” [6]  
The tests determined that “the test platform 
[was] a suitable testing environment prior to deployment on 
a live network.” [6] 
As stated earlier, Taff and Salevski limited the 
scope of their project to replicating malware – worms, 
viruses, etc. They included the potential expansion of the 
MM Software to human-centric behavior as possible follow on 
work [6]. 
2. The Second Wave: Neff, Hammond, and Longoria 
Justin Neff, James Hammond (who gave the tool its 
current name) and Ray Longoria next built upon the concepts 
of Taff and Salevski [6].  
a. Justin Neff 
In his thesis titled “Verification and Validation 
of the Malicious Activity Simulation Tool (MAST) for 
Network Administrator Training and Evaluation”, Justin Neff 
sought to “further [Taff and Salevski’s] research of a 
software based ‘Malware Mimic’ training tool to increase 
the standardization and availability of network cyber 
defense training.” [7]  
Similarly to his predecessors, Neff’s motivation 
for this work was “the increased security of the DoD’s 
computer network assets and ipso facto, the security of the 
nation as a whole.” [7] He aimed to produce this increase 
in network security through improved training for DoD 
network administrators.  
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To this end he continued the MM project as it 
evolved into the Malicious Activity Simulation Tool. His 
thesis discussed system design advances and modifications, 
and provided a qualitative analysis of MAST compared 
against other training methods. 
 
Figure 1.  The MAST Network. From [7]. 
(1) Design Advances: Neff’s work provided 
insight into the design maturation of MAST. In it, he 
defined advances that he and James Hammond implemented in 
the system, server, and host designs. He also discussed the 
local built-in safety feature, i.e. a software-based “kill 
switch.” [7] The program was still in a virtual 
environment, but the number of servers (3) and clients (25-
30) were increasing as the Virtual Machine (VM) network was 
expanded to replicate a current DoD network: the Common PC 
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Operating System Environment onboard a U.S. Navy Guided 
Missile Cruiser; specifically CG-71. 
The local software-based “kill switch” 
(Figure 1) is configured, Neff described, such that should 
local conditions warrant the immediate termination of the 
training scenario, local personnel could end the scenario 
without having to notify the remote trainer. This would not 
just halt simulated malicious behavior; it would also 
immediately “roll back” MAST to its idle state. The 
network, “as a result of this rollback action, returns to 
normal operation.” [7] 
Furthermore, Neff discussed that when a 
scenario is in progress, should the host lose contact with 
the remote server, MAST would immediately exit the scenario 
and roll back to its idle state [7]. 
(2) Design Modifications: In his thesis, 
Neff introduced the functionality of MAST as a local 
training tool, where previously it had been designed solely 
for remote training. The idea was for this feature to allow 
MAST to provide a value “similar to NSST” (the Navigation 
Seamanship Shiphandling Trainer), a program that allows 
junior officers to improve their navigational proficiency 
without the expense of getting ships underway. In the case 
of MAST users, no longer would they have to wait for 
externally performed penetration testing. Rather, they 
could “self-test” their network’s defenses [7].  
Another useful modification was the addition 
of a database to log the results of a training scenario for 
comparison with past or future results allowing for “more 
consistent feedback on training scenarios.” [7] 
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(3) Qualitative Analysis: A primary 
contribution to MAST development offered by Neff was the 
evaluation of MAST’s training utility against that of Red 
Teams, the Rapid Experience Builder (RaD-X), and the 
Metasploit Framework, to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
MAST as a training tool [7]. This he accomplished through 
the evaluation of ten different training attributes common 
to the four methods being examined. These attributes 
included such training concerns as availability, 
consistency, ease of use of training tool, and training 
infrastructure. 
(4) A Step Further: Toward the end of his 
work, Neff described what he saw as the “way ahead” for 
MAST, noting that testing would be required to show that 
the MAST system “accurately mimics the malware we have 
implemented in the modules.” MAST’s scalability would need 
to be demonstrated, he said, and MAST would then be ready 
for testing on a cyber range [7]. 
Notably, Neff also anticipated that in the 
future as new scenario modules were created to mimic the 
most current threats facing a network they would “be 
‘pushed’ out to all pertinent network administrators” in 
the same way that software patches or Information Assurance 
Vulnerability Alerts (IAVAs) are currently “pushed” to 
military commands [7]. 
b. James Hammond 
James Hammond defined his work as “Malicious 
Behavior Expansion” and contributed to the MAST project by 
improving and expanding MAST’s architecture (both virtual 
and actual) [8]. He also expanded the malware behaviors 
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that MAST would replicate through what he referred to as 
“client modules” (i.e., Simware modules), and assisted in 
the creation of some of those modules. 
(1) Grouping Malicious Behavior: Hammond 
defined malicious behavior selection as depicted in Figure 
2. In this diagram he refined the scope of the types of 
malware that MAST would simulate [8]. 
  
Figure 2.  Malicious Behavior Detection Diagram. From [8]. 
Group 1 behaviors are Host Based Security 
System (HBSS) detectable but not user detectable, and are 
designed: 
• Not to impact network users (though 
users could be impacted by system 
administrator actions) 
• To test proper configuration of HBSS 
and network devices/sensors and 
• To test network administrator’s ability 
to detect and properly respond to 
malicious activity [8] 
Although these behaviors are listed as user 
undetectable, network administrators should still be 
capable of detecting their presence and responding. 
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Group 2 behaviors are detectable by HBSS and users and are 
designed: 
• To disrupt network user activity 
• To test proper configuration of HBSS 
and network devices/sensors 
• To test network administrator’s ability 
to detect and properly respond to 
malicious activity and 
• To test user’s ability to operate in 
the presence of malicious network 
activity [8] 
(2) Use Cases: Hammond also discussed two 
sets of “Use Cases.” [8] The first “[p]rovide the ability 
for trained personnel to execute pre-developed cyber 
training scenarios to support local training objectives, 
readiness assessments, tests and evaluation.” [8] 
The second set “[p]rovide the ability for 
highly trained personnel to develop, distribute, and 
remotely execute complex cyber training scenarios to 
support readiness assessment; test and evaluation; and 
cyber tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) 
development” (emphasis in original) [8]. 
(3) Planned Client Modules: Hammond defined 
the following planned Simware modules for future work: 
• Virus (drop EICAR files randomly across 
host/hosts) 
• Worm propagation (scanning activity and 
associated network traffic) 
• Browser Hijack (local host file 
modification or other method) 
• Switch Overflow (attempt to overflow 
switch routing table and report 
results) 
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• Traffic Sniffer (monitor for given 
parameters and report when met) 
• Data Exfiltration (send client module 
generated data to an off network 
device; could be expanded to capture 
actual data and send off network) 
• Event Monitor (email attachment 
execution, cookie creation, etc.) 
• Network Reconnaissance (port/protocol 
scanning, horizontal scanning, raster 
scanning) 
• DoS (e.g., SYN flood) [8] 
c. Ray Longoria Jr. 
Ray Longoria Jr.’s thesis titled “Scalability 
Assessments for the Malicious Activity Simulation Tool 
(MAST)” demonstrated the scalability of MAST, specifically 
“that an exponential increase in clients using MAST did not 
significantly impact network and system resources.” [9] 
Part of Longoria’s motivation in the MAST project 
was to rectify DoD network administrator training 
deficiencies that he identified [9]. To address these 
shortfalls, MAST, he said, “is designed to simulate and 
automate some of the training methods conducted by Red 
Teams” and “One of MAST’s key functions is to provide 
reports on the events surrounding a training scenario.” 
Before moving forward, some clarification is necessary for 
these statements.  
When something is automated it operates with 
minimal human intervention or independent of external 
control [16]. It is critical to this project to clarify 
exactly what is being automated. In this case, the results 
of each training scenario (the “reports on the events” 
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Longoria described) will be automatically logged in the 
Local or Remote Databases (Figure 3). This will provide 
timely feedback to the trainers and those who are being 
trained, and will allow them to compare past and present 
results to demonstrate progress or setbacks. In this way 
they satisfy Longoria’s motivation for improvements to 
information professional’s training. 
Original iterations of MAST that were tested in 
the VM environment were capable of demonstrating and 
implementing this behavior. However, at this time the 
degree to which the logging function will be a part of the 
final MAST product is uncertain. 
(1) Research Tests: Longoria’s research 
objectives were to determine the feasibility of loading 
MAST on a given network and to show the impact MAST had on 
system and network resources [9]. To accomplish these 
objectives he performed two tests. The first examined the 
“impact of deploying MAST from a remote location to a new 
training network that does not have MAST installed.” The 
second determined “how MAST uses and impacts system and 
network resources” as the client load was increased.  
Longoria performed the bulk of his work and 
testing on scalability at the same time that Hammond and 
the system programmers were working to expand MAST’s VM 
network, and therefore their work went hand-in-hand. 
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Figure 3.  MAST Network with Databases. From [9]. 
(2) Results: Longoria’s first set of tests 
demonstrated that “over-the-air (OTA) deployment and local 
installation is [sic] fast and efficient.” [9]  
The second set of tests verified that system 
performance did not decrease when client scale was 
increased:  
“An increase in the number of clients tested did 
not result in a similar proportional increase in 
utilization of processing resources. 
Additionally, an increase in the number of 
clients and network traffic generated to control 
those clients resulted in very minimal use of 
network resources.” [9]  
Longoria’s findings demonstrated “minimal 
impact on Central Processing Unit (CPU) resources and the 
capability to serve more clients with ease.”  
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An additional finding of Longoria’s thesis 
was in the distribution of feedback and results to the 
Scenario Execution and Scenario Generation servers, a part 
of the training improvements mentioned previously. In the 
VM network, MAST demonstrated the ability to submit 
feedback and reports with efficiency. Further details, 
graphs, and specifics of Longoria’s findings can be found 
in his thesis [9]. 
3. The Third Wave: Hayes and Littlejohn/Makhlouf 
As has been the case for some of the previous authors, 
the motivation for these theses is responding to a need for 
increased DoD cyber readiness by improving the skill level 
of DoD network administrators [17]. MAST provides the 
avenue of approach for addressing this need and we see it 
as a tool whose implementation will prepare and train 
network personnel for penetration testing that seeks to 
identify network security readiness concerns.  
The objective of the first thesis is to create a 
quantitative testing procedure for the MAST Software as it 
is loaded onto a DoD approved cyber testing range. 
Littlejohn and Makhlouf will then execute this step-by-step 
testing process, satisfying the objectives of their joint 
thesis. 
In addition to testing, Littlejohn and Makhlouf will 
be performing background work to identify assumptions, 
constraints, and restraints of the MAST Software. An 
example of this is the oft stated but inaccurate assumption 
that the purpose of a Red Team is to provide training to 
tested personnel. The true purpose of a Red Team is to 
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engage in penetration testing to determine the health of a 
network [18]. 
Entering a Red Team exercise without preparation and 
with the expectation of receiving training and guidance 
from them is akin to showing up to a football game with the 
hope that the opponent will assist in practice snaps. A 
penetration test is not the time to receive training; it is 
game time, and should be approached with the same mentality 
as General Quarters or any other training exercise in an 
operational environment.  
Preparation for penetration testing must have occurred 
beforehand to ensure that network administrators are 
prepared to fight the ship’s networks. Ideally this 
training is based on a simulation of what will be 
encountered during penetration testing, and this is the 
training value MAST will provide [18]. 
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III. TESTING ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter examines the quantitative testing 
environment, current testing and implementation methods, 
and criteria for cyber programs in the Department of 
Defense. With a focus on areas pertinent to the Testing 
Group (see Definitions, Ch II), it includes a look at the 
various DoD cyber range sites and their standards; the 
operating platform’s backbone networks on which a program 
would run; and the typical software suite with which the 
program would interface. Additionally, a brief discussion 
on Security and Enterprise System Management, notably HBSS, 
will be included. 
A. RANGES 
DoD and DON cyber ranges provide fundamental 
validation and accreditation of systems interfacing with or 
operating within DoD and DON systems, as well as the 
training and education of cyberspace personnel. The 
conceptual backing for cyber ranges that perform these 
services is established in National Security Presidential 
Directive 54 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) [19]. 
NSPD-54/HSPD-23 was issued by President George W. Bush 
in January 2008, and formalizes the Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). The CNCI provides the 
necessary backing from the top of the Chain-of-Command to 
mandate the push to a technically proficient force capable 
of operating in the cyberspace domain with the same level 
of excellence exhibited in the traditional warfare domains. 
It institutes a series of continuous efforts to improve 
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cyberspace security and harden federal government systems 
to attacks and threats initiated from a cyber vector.  
The CNCI focuses on three key areas:  
• Establishing a frontline defense against 
immediate threats by creating and enhancing 
shared situational awareness of network 
vulnerabilities and threats, and the ability to 
act quickly to reduce current vulnerabilities and 
prevent intrusions 
• Defending against the full spectrum of threats by 
enhancing counterintelligence and increasing 
supply chain security for key information 
technologies 
• Strengthening the future cyber security 
environment by expanding cyber education; 
coordinating and redirecting R&D (research and 
development) efforts; and working to develop 
strategies to deter hostile or malicious activity 
in cyberspace [19] 
Meeting the challenges set forth in the CNCI of 
defending and operating in cyberspace requires expertise in 
cyber domain operations. Operations in this newest warfare 
domain require both intellectual knowledge of and the 
skills and ability to gain access to this battlespace. The 
tools and weapons needed to gain this knowledge and access 
are changing at a pace never seen in any of the traditional 
domains. In this way cyber domain intelligence preparation 
of the battlespace differs from the domains in which U.S. 
military branches have become proficient operators.  
It is in this capacity that the importance of cyber 
ranges is realized, as they provide the simulated 
environments in which tools such as MAST can be developed, 
tested, improved, and fleet approved. 
This section is devoted to a discussion on DoD cyber 
ranges. As such, individuals with a prior understanding of 
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cyber ranges may consider skipping to Section B, Shipboard 
Environments. This discussion is relevant to the 
quantitative testing process because it provides a single 
gathering point for information on five specific ranges. 
Thorough examination of the facilities and capabilities of 
each site will aid in narrowing the field of DoD cyber 
testing sites for the Testing Group.  
The following is a practical literature review based 
upon range overviews provided by cyber range supervisors 
themselves. Looking at the various DoD ranges educates the 
process of choosing the location at which a program such as 
MAST would be tested. This section examines functionality 
testing sites and standards, but stops short of researching 
the DON and DoD certification and accreditation 
requirements processes for DoD ranges, as that is outside 
the scope of this study. 
Additionally, there are other DoD ranges available 
that will not be discussed in this chapter. In the 2012 
Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education 
Conference (I/ITSEC) Paper No. 12408, Harwell and Gore of 
Camber Corporation state that the Air Force has 78 
simulators at three locations in Illinois, Mississippi, and 
Florida – only the range at Scott Air Force Base (AFB), IL 
will be discussed here. U.S. Strategic Command’s (STRATCOM) 
range, the STRATCOM Cyber Operations Range (SCOR), in 
Nebraska, will similarly not be discussed. Nor will some 
cyber training simulators such as the National Guard’s Army 
Guard Enterprise Network Training Simulator (ARGENTS) be 
discussed here [20]. Rather, this discussion will be 
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limited to the cyber ranges that the Testing Group are more 
likely to use in the testing of MAST.  
Our selection of cyber ranges includes the following: 
• Joint Information Operations Range (JIOR), 
Suffolk, VA 
• Joint Cyber Operations Range/Simulator Training 
and Exercise (JCOR/SIMTEX), Scott AFB, IL 
• Department of Defense Information Assurance Range 
(DoDIAR), Stafford, VA 
• National Cyber Range (NCR), Orlando, FL 
• Navy Cyberspace Operations Range (NCOR), Norfolk, 
VA 
Finally, the bulk of the discussion in this section is 
devoted to the site standards and specifications of the DoD 
IA Range, the National Cyber Range, and the Navy Cyberspace 
Operations Range, as these were found to most closely mimic 
DON network’s typical load outs.  
1. Joint Information Operations Range (JIOR)  
JIOR provides a Joint cyberspace operations testing 
environment. JIOR is managed from the Joint Staff J7 
headquartered in Suffolk, VA. According to their 
publications, the Range is a “closed-loop, secure, 
worldwide-distributed network that forms a realistic and 
relevant live-fire cyberspace environment supporting 
Combatant Command, Service, and Agency, (CC/S/A) and Test 
Community training, testing, and experimentation across the 
Information Operations and Cyberspace mission areas.” [21]  
The JIOR provides the ability to train and test in a 
degraded or denied environment on tactical, operational, 
and strategic levels. Locally delegated authority also 
allows rapid approval of training and testing events. Most 
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significantly, JIOR provides connectivity to other DoD and 
Service’s cyber ranges in addition to those of other 
agencies, National Labs, Industry, and Academia [21].
 
Figure 4.  A Typical JIOR Event Architecture. From [21]. 
The JIOR is used to test Command and Control (C2) 
technologies as they traverse the acquisition life cycle. 
The JIOR network has been accredited and certified by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and offensive and 
defensive cyberspace capabilities can be tried in any of 
seven potential levels of security - from Unclassified to 
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) [22]. 
Additional information regarding JIOR facilities and 
capabilities, as well as methods to gain access to these 
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can be obtained through the point of contact (POC) provided 
in the Appendix. 
2. Joint Cyber Operations Range/U.S. Air Force 
Simulator Training and Exercise (JCOR/SIMTEX)  
JCOR/SIMTEX is the environment at Scott AFB, IL, run 
by Camber Corporation on behalf of the Air Force. JCOR is a 
consortium of users that utilize Camber’s cyber simulators 
to conduct training (both formal and operational) along 
with participating in Joint, Service and government 
exercises.  This consortium currently includes the Air 
Force, Navy, National Guard, and USSTRATCOM as full-time 
members [22, 23]. 
JCOR is capable of being distributed via previously 
discussed JIOR connectivity. The JCOR environment is 
typically utilized as an Air Force specific training 
environment, but can be adapted for use by other entities 
[22, 23]. 
For the Navy, JCOR’s simulator can represent afloat 
units and afloat Navy Operations Centers (NOCs) with sensor 
feeds representing Navy Cyber Defense Operations Command 
(NCDOC).  This representation is housed at the Navy 
Information Operations Command (NIOC) in Norfolk, and 
managed by the 10TH FLEET N72. The Navy currently uses the 
simulator for cyber exercises; operational training, such 
as the Computer Network Team Trainer (CNTT); tool 
development for Navy Red Teams; HBSS training; and other 
miscellaneous uses [22, 23]. 
In 2012, the Camber Corp. provided the simulators with 
traffic and attack generation for the National Collegiate 
Cyber Defense Competition Finals in San Antonio, TX and 
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will take part in the 2013 competition as well. However, 
the simulators are normally used for USAF cyber personnel 
training and Computer Network Defense in Depth courses of 
instruction.   
Each simulator environment is designed to the 
specifications of the users’ operational environment and is 
scalable and interoperable. They also have both classified 
and unclassified capabilities depending on the environment 
and the requirements they support [22, 23]. 
Additional information regarding JCOR facilities and 
capabilities, as well as methods to gain access to these 
can be obtained through the POC provided in the Appendix. 
3. Department of Defense Information Assurance Range 
(DoDIAR)  
DoDIAR is located near Marine Corps Base, Quantico in 
Stafford, VA. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
provides program sponsorship for DoDIAR. Headquarters 
Marine Corps (HQMC) Command, Control, Communications, and 
Computers (C4) provides program management, Certification 
and Accreditation (C&A), program outreach, and contract 
support for the Range [22].  
HQMC C4, in partnership with DISA Program Executive 
Office for Mission Assurance (PEO-MA) and the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense, has also enabled the DoDIAR to 
support the training, exercise, and test and evaluation 
communities in the pursuit of the following stated goals: 
to exercise cyber warriors; to test and evaluate new 
capabilities; and to train network defenders [22, 24].  
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DoDIAR was created and funded on the basis of the CNCI 
and was commissioned to develop and host a realistic DoD 
GIG. This fully accredited environment provides “maneuver 
areas where Cyber Warriors can conduct cyber training, 
testing, and exercises in an environment identical to their 
daily field of battle.” [25]  
DoDIAR is reflective of GIG Information 
Assurance/Computer Network Defense (IA/CND) capabilities 
and network services and provides a Joint-Services 
environment for cyber exercises, Computer Network Defense 
Service Provider (CNDSP) training, and testing and 
evaluation of CND products and operational TTPs [25].  
There are no actual classes or cyber exercises 
performed by Range personnel; rather, that is a customer 
function that they facilitate. They maintain the network 
spaces required to execute cyber tests and training [25]. 
DoDIAR normally provides fee-based access, however its 
services would be available to the Testing Group at no 
cost, as is the case for all DoD personnel. Access to the 
Range can be achieved either remotely (using a Remote 
Boundary Suite [RBS] via a secure Virtual Private Network 
[VPN] tunnel) or locally in Stafford Virginia [24].  
The IA Range may be operated in a standalone simulator 
mode or can interface and interoperate with other ranges 
provided by CC/S/A. Communications are secure between all 
parts of the IA Range and the CC/S/A virtual enclaves. 
Range traffic is routed on a closed network environment. 
This prevents accidental leakage of classified, 
proprietary, or potentially hazardous entities to 
operational networks [22, 24]. 
 31 
DoDIAR currently operates at the “Unclassified” level.  
In July of 2012 the Range built an identical environment to 
the one in Figure 5 that will be capable of operations at 
the Secret level.  It is the same unclassified GIG, but in 
an environment where Secret TTPs can be developed and 
practiced, Secret defense or attack tools can be 
incorporated, or Secret scenarios can be executed.  This 
Secret environment incorporates a Secure Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRNet) backbone that rides on the GIG.  
In fiscal year (FY) 13, the Cyber Range will have an 
identical environment that will operate at the Top 
Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) level 
with a SIPR and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 
System (JWICS) network riding on the GIG [24]. 
According to the DISA Security Technical 
Implementation Guide (STIG), the IA Range is required to 
perform as a “closed network environment,” meaning it is 
forbidden from connecting to any live network because of 
the concerns stated previously. The DISA STIG identifies 
these types of environments as “Zone D enclaves.”  These 
enclaves may be closed but are permitted to connect to 
other Zone D environments, and DoDIAR was designed to 
perform these connections. In this way the Range can 
provide customers with closed labs access to its virtual 
DoD GIG as well as the enterprise services DISA provides 
[24]. 
Additional information regarding DoDIAR facilities and 
capabilities, as well as methods to gain access to these 
can be obtained through the POCs provided in the Appendix. 
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Figure 5.  DoD IA Range Topology. From [24]. 
a. DoD IA Range Topology Analysis: 
A general, abbreviated description of the DoD IA 
Range’s topology as it is depicted in Figure 5 follows, 
taken from the original figure in Range documentation: 
“The IAR provides a Multi Protocol Label 
Switching (MPLS) cloud comprised of [six] 
Provider Edge (PE) routers representative of the 
DISA GIG.  Downstream from [five] of the PE 
routers are interactive bases that are composed 
of the standard Cisco design model for networks 
(Core Layer, Distribution Layer, Access Layer) 
with [eight] disparate distribution zones (user 
zones) to simulate a given base’s cable plant, as 
well as a server farm hosting the following 
services: email (MS Exchange), Active Directory, 
Domain Name System (DNS), Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), file share, and print services.  
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Each user zone within a base can support 10 
Virtual Local Area Networks (VLAN) comprised of 
254 users per VLAN.  Downstream from the [six]th 
PE router are [two] facilities for hosting 
specialized applications similar to the 
functionality of DISA Defense Enterprise 
Computing Center (DECC) and Community Data Center 
(CDC).  Currently, the IAR CDC hosts both 
ArcSight and SourceFire.” [24] 
4. The National Cyber Range (NCR)  
NCR utilizes a prototype built by Lockheed Martin, and 
is located at the Lockheed Martin Facility in Orlando, FL. 
CNCI provides funding for the NCR initiative that was run 
by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
until Oct 2012, when it transitioned to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (OSD/AT&L) Test Resource Management Center to 
determine its operational relevance and capabilities to 
rapidly provision large-scale environments representative 
of DoD Networks. At the time of the NCR Program Overview 
the size of the NCR range was sufficient to emulate a DOD 
network of 3000 users [22, 26]. 
The objective of the NCR is to provide a testing 
environment that supports the CNCI’s key focuses (discussed 
earlier) through supporting the development of advanced 
technologies, with the goal of creating a secure 
representation of DoD and industry networks. This would 
improve the certification process for cyber technologies 
[26]. 
According to Lockheed Martin’s 2012 Program Overview 
for NCR, the primary objectives of the Range are to “enable 
multiple, independent, simultaneous experiments from the 
Unclassified to TS/SCI level at the same time; enable rapid 
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construction of experiments; and rapid sanitization and 
reuse of assets after experiments’ conclusion.” [26] 
Lockheed Martin hopes to achieve these objectives by 
enabling a “5-10 fold reduction in the time (one to six 
months reduced to three to 30 days) and cost ($1-5 million 
cut to $50,000 to $500,000) for cyber testing and 
research.” [26] 
a. NCR Key Features 
The prototype that Lockheed Martin designed and 
built for NCR provides a number of key features, some of 
which would prove useful to the Testing Group should they 
chose to utilize NCR as a test site. The first of these is 
simple design tools to enable users to quickly design the 
network topology and specific tests for a cyber experiment.  
These tools can also be run at the users’ location, 
increasing accessibility to cyber testing [26]. 
The second key feature discussed in the 2012 
Program Overview is the “employment of hardware and 
software tools that automate the process of building out 
and configuring NCR for a cyber test consisting of 
thousands of physical machines.” This would allow for a 
reduction in the time that is spent configuring the range 
for a large-scale test from months to hours [26]. 
The third key feature is an “automated range 
sanitization process to completely reset the range after 
testing for reuse at any classification level.” This would 
allow for the introduction and testing of new code without 
endangering the range itself [26]. 
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Last, employing a security architecture that 
allows multiple experiments to run on the range 
simultaneously with different classification levels would 
again allow for maximum range utilization. NCR is 
accredited for TS/SAP, and was undergoing SCI accreditation 
testing at the time of this composition. Range users must 
possess a minimum clearance of Secret, and Privileged Users 
will require access to the highest clearance level of data 
processed [26]. 
 
Figure 6.  The NCR Automated Cyber Test Process Cycle. 
From [26]. 
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b. The NCR Automated Cyber Test Process Cycle 
NCR has a seven-step, automated cyber test 
process that would guide the Testing Group through its 
cyber and test evaluations. The process starts with a 
common pool of hardware (HW) and software (SW) resources 
and cyber tool sets. The follow-on steps as described by 
Range documents are: 
Step 1: Define Test – Utilize test specific tools 
to define end to end aspects of test  
Step 2: Allocate Resources – Automated scheduler 
determines what resources from the pool are needed and 
allocates them to test  
Step 3: Configure HW – Range Configuration Tools 
automatically wire HW to the appropriate configuration 
Step 4: Configure SW – Range Configuration Tools 
automatically configure and verify the SW needed to run 
test 
Step 5: Run Test – Test team validates 
environment, installs System Under Test and runs 
test/collects data using toolset  
Step 6: Sanitize Resources – Sanitize HW and 
“virtually” put HW/SW resources back in pool 
The completion of Step 6 results in a full circle 
to the starting point where previously run cyber/test 
evaluations can be re-evaluated, or entirely new ones can 
be processed in the same cycle [26]. 
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c. NCR Test Configurations:  
The testing configurations that are possible at 
NCR include but are not limited to: a standard military 
NOC, a small business network, a university network, or a 
home network infected with malware. Example test vectors 
include scans, Malware Injection (such as Metasploit or 
Repository), or command line actions [26]. 
Additional information regarding the NCR’s 
facilities and capabilities, as well as methods to gain 
access to these can be obtained through the POC provided in 
the Appendix. 
5. Navy Cyberspace Operations Range (NCOR)  
NCOR is located at the Navy Information Operations 
Center (NIOC) in Norfolk, VA. The Navy currently uses the 
simulator there for cyber exercises; operational training, 
such as the CNTT; tool development for Navy Red Teams; and 
HBSS training, among others [27].   
Camber Corporation’s NCOR Overview provides a list of 
the Range’s capabilities. In addition to cyber exercises, 
operational assessments, and tools and application 
development, the Range also provides penetration testing, 
competition hosting, mission rehearsals, network 
validations, certification and accreditation support, and 
training - both on-site and distance learning when remote 
connectivity is available [27]. 
a. System Description 
The NCOR Overview gives a general definition of 
this Range as “a suite of equipment that creates a 
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simulation network; a cyber exercise, assessment, and 
training simulator/environment, as well as an application 
development and testing network.” [27] 
NCOR is an isolated computing and networking 
environment that replicates realistic network enclaves 
where the Testing Group could test MAST without endangering 
operational or production networks. It is also noteworthy 
that NCOR is currently used to test commercial and custom 
developed security applications, such as HBSS and Navy Red 
and Blue Team toolkits, under varied networking 
configurations [27]. 
NCOR can operate as a stand-alone range and, 
because it uses standard protocols, it can also be 
connected with other ranges via isolated range WANs, such 
as the JIOR or DoDIAR (see Ch III.A.1 and .3), to network 
equipment in order to form larger environments. NCOR’s 
expanded operating architecture is centered on the JCOR WAN 




Figure 7.  NCOR’s Conceptual Network. From [27]. 
b. The NCOR Operating Environment 
NCOR consists of servers, routers, switches, and 
security appliances configured to simulate Navy afloat 
networks. Ship-to-Shore IP data flow and packet forwarding 
has been replicated at the Range, and the hardware and 
software components used are industry standard items that 
are commonly found within the fleet (e.g. Cisco routers, 
Alcatel switches, McAfee Intrushield, Sidewinder Firewall, 
Windows 2003/2008 servers) [27]. 
Significantly to the MAST Testing Group, the 
Cyber Range has been pre-loaded with a shipboard-configured 
Common PC Operating System Environment 3.0.1 (See Ch 
III.B.1) domain with an integrated HBSS solution. 
Additionally, “NCOR’s exercise servers and workstations are 
virtualized within a VMWare ESXi 5.0 framework.  This 
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virtualization enables the simulation environment to be 
rapidly reset after training events.” [27] 
Additional information regarding the Navy Cyber 
Operation Range’s facilities and capabilities, as well as 
methods to gain access to these can be obtained through the 
POCs provided in the Appendix. 
6. Summary: 
This section has furnished an overview of the 
capabilities and facilities of five DoD ranges: JCOR, JIOR, 
DoDIAR, NCR, and NCOR. This serves the purpose of providing 
a single gathering point for information on these varied 
ranges. Additionally it provides the Testing Group with the 
base of information necessary to choose a range for the 
quantitative testing process. 
The following section is devoted to a discussion on 
Navy Shipboard Environments, specifically the Common PC 
Operating System Environment (COMPOSE) and the Consolidated 
Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES). As such, 
individuals with a prior understanding of these may 
consider skipping to Section C, Shore Environments. 
B. SHIPBOARD ENVIRONMENTS: COMPOSE/CANES 
A discussion of Shipboard Environments is relevant to 
the quantitative testing process because the Testing Group 
will need to prove that MAST is capable of interfacing with 
legacy and current versions of COMPOSE if it is to become a 
useful shipboard network administrator training tool. 
Tolerance for legacy architecture and programs is 
imperative because of the prevalence of older, sometimes 
outdated systems and programs. This requirement was 
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reemphasized as recently as February 2013, in Operational 
Navy Instruction (OPNAVINST) 9410.5C, the Navy Tactical 
C4ISR Interoperability Procedural Interface Standards 
Requirements, Certification, and Testing [12].  
As for CANES, its installation is scheduled to be 
complete on 192 platforms in the next five years [28]. It 
therefore becomes equally imperative for MAST to be capable 
of interoperations with CANES in order for it to 
efficiently operate on all shipboard platforms.  
This section provides an examination of COMPOSE and 
CANES to demonstrate the importance of interoperations with 
each, and to prepare the Testing Group for operating in 
each Environment. 
The Department of the Navy’s Chief Information Officer 
(DON CIO) is responsible for oversight and management of 
Naval networks both ashore and afloat. This includes 
developing strategy for the Naval Networking Environment 
(NNE); participating in acquisition milestone gate reviews; 
and ensuring interoperability, developing policy and 
providing compliance oversight for the COMPOSE and CANES 
Environments, among others [29, 30].  
COMPOSE and CANES fall under the cognizance of the 
Navy's Tactical Networks Program Office, Program Manager, 
Warfare (PMW) 160, located in San Diego, CA, and reports to 
the Navy's Program Executive Office for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I) [31]. 
The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR, 
the Navy's Information Dominance systems command) website 
states that PMW 160 provides affordable, interoperable, and 
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secure net-centric enterprise capabilities to the Navy. PMW 
160 also provides the network services used by many 
shipboard tactical and business applications and systems, a 
common network infrastructure across security domains, and 
supports cross-domain and coalition operations [32]. 
COMPOSE and CANES are Shipboard Environments similar 
to the OS of a computer. COMPOSE is common throughout the 
fleet and provides a Microsoft© Windows™ OS for the server 
and clients, as well as the necessary software required to 
carry out standard Navy business [29]. CANES is the 
technical and infrastructure consolidation of existing, 
separately-managed, afloat networks. Navy networks began 
transition to CANES in the first quarter of FY 2013 [28]. 
1. The Common PC Operating System Environment 
(COMPOSE) Program  
COMPOSE provides a common office-automation 
environment for the conduct of standard Navy business, such 
as maintenance scheduling and supply ordering. Fielding for 
COMPOSE first began in April 2004. COMPOSE was able to 
offer a much improved architecture over its predecessor 
(GOTS-Delta) by utilizing a modular commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) software 
bundle that delivered directory services, e-mail, web 
acceleration, office automation applications, and antivirus 
software [29, 33].  
According to DON CIO, COMPOSE provided two major 
benefits to the Navy when it was implemented: security and 
cost savings. First, the introduction of Windows™ 2000 
Server architecture into the fleet came “as part of PMW 
160's solution to the risk posed by Windows™ NT End-of-Life 
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(EOL).” Second, “[it] marked the beginning of a steady and 
deliberate progression away from GOTS toward COTS 
solutions.” COMPOSE services also came in a secure software 
bundle that aligned to the latest DISA standards and 
guidelines [29, 33]. 
The COMPOSE architecture provided these streamlined 
upgrades, services, and software to the Integrated 
Shipboard Network System (ISNS), Combined Enterprise 
Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS), SCI 
networks, and Submarine Local Area Network (SubLAN). 
COMPOSE was also utilized as a core component for such PORs 
and systems as: Global Command and Control System-Maritime 
(GCCS-M), Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS), 
Distributed Common Ground System – Navy (DCGS-N), and the 
Navy’s latest Guided Missile Destroyer, DDG-1000 [29, 33].  
Additionally, (and of particular importance to the 
Testing Group) older versions of Windows™ clients were 
supported in order to provide compatibility for legacy 
applications that had not yet transitioned to more recent 
versions of Windows™ supported by subsequent COMPOSE 
upgrades. A tolerance for legacy architecture and programs 
is imperative for any system or program seeking 
implementation in the fleet because of the prevalence of 
older, sometimes outdated, systems and programs. [34]. 
Table 1 shows the basic implementation and EOL 
timeline, the OS version for both server and workstation, 
and the fielded networks for GOTS-Delta and the initial and 









2. Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise 
Services (CANES)  
CANES is a network environment developed by Lockheed 
Martin, MS2 Tactical Systems in San Diego, CA, and Northrop 
Grumman Space and Mission Systems Corporation in Reston, 
VA. CANES has been designated as the technology replacement 
for the current afloat networks and is to become the Navy’s 
core-computing infrastructure [35]. According to Jane’s 
[28], as of December 2012, installation had begun on the 
first of 10 CANES systems planned for fiscal year 2013. The 
Navy began the initial work of removing and replacing the 
legacy hardware and cabling associated with the previous 
network system aboard USS Milius (DDG 69). The installation 
was expected to take 18 weeks, and should be completed on 
192 platforms in the next five years [28]. 
CANES is the technical and infrastructure 
consolidation of current afloat networks and was designed 
to provide the necessary infrastructure for applications, 
systems, and services for shipboard operations. CANES 
combined several separately managed afloat networks such as 
ISNS, CENTRIXS-Maritime (CENTRIXS-M), and SCI Networks. 
These legacy afloat network designs reached EOL starting in 
FY 2012, and CANES has been replacing them as they become 
unaffordable and obsolete [35, 36]. 
A large number of applications are currently hosted on 
the ISNS Early Adopter Network preceding CANES, and CANES 
will host even more. It is designed to operate unattended, 
with network management tools continuously monitoring key 
system parameters and services [37]. The Navy hopes that 
CANES will bring standardization across the fleet by 
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reducing the variants of networks currently in use. This 
will enable information technology (IT) sailors to engage 
in ship-to-ship transfers and run virtually the same 
network, resulting in a consistency that has been 
previously lacking on afloat platforms.  
Through this transition, the Navy will also gain 
inherent IA and security capabilities that were not built 
into legacy networks but were added as an afterthought when 
cyber security risks arose [28]. 
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force’s 
(COMOPTEVFOR) Integrated Evaluation Framework (IEF) [38] 
describes CANES as “the hardware, OSs, and end user devices 
within four distinct security enclaves that provides 
Multilevel Security (MLS) network access through Cross 
Domain Solutions (CDS)” (see Figure 8) for all basic 
network services to a wide variety of Navy operational 
platforms. It goes on to say: “CANES implements a Common 
Computing Environment (CCE) for application hosting that is 
intended to provide enough server capacity to support 
shipboard computing requirements and all business, 
intelligence, and warfighting POR systems.”  
Regarding those POR systems, the U.S Navy Program 
Guide 2012 states that “approximately 36 hosted 
applications and systems… require CANES infrastructure in 
order to operate in the tactical environment… [and] are 
dependent on the CANES [CCE] to field, host, and sustain 
their capability because they no longer provide their own 
hardware.” [35] 
It is also noteworthy that CANES plans to provide 
functionality currently provided in elements of Afloat 
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Computer Network Defense (ACND). CANES will field on 
rolling four-year hardware and two-year software baselines 
and will achieve full deployment by FY 2023 [35]. 
 
Figure 8.  CANES Topology. From [37]. 
a. CANES Topology  
Each of the four CANES security enclaves hosts a 
separate system of systems.  Common characteristics include 
shipboard support systems, Automated Digital Network System 
(ADNS), Navigation Sensor System Interface (NAVSSI), 
locally and remotely hosted applications, connections to 
the GIG, and remotely accessible services [38]. 
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3. Summary 
A program tool such as MAST must be capable of 
interfacing with COMPOSE and CANES if it is to function on 
afloat operating platforms. To wit, this section furnished 
basic information on these shipboard environments to the 
Testing Group to facilitate their understanding and 
knowledge of them. 
The following section introduces the DON shore 
environments, specifically the Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI), the OCONUS Navy Enterprise Network (ONE-Net), and 
the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN). Again, 
individuals with a prior understanding of these may 
consider moving ahead to Section D, Security and Enterprise 
System Management. 
C. SHORE ENVIRONMENTS: NAVAL ENTERPRISE NETWORKS (NEN)  
This discussion is relevant to the quantitative 
testing process because working within NMCI, ONE-Net, or 
NGEN is a daily and necessary part of Navy network 
operations. This section provides some general information 
and overall system parameters to facilitate the 
understanding of these environments and operations in them. 
As mentioned in the previous section, DON CIO is 
responsible for oversight and management of Naval networks. 
This includes developing strategy for the NEN, both ship- 
and shore-based, and ensuring interoperability, developing 
policy and providing compliance oversight [30]. 
NEN is part of the DON Program Executive Office for 
Enterprise Information Systems (PEO-EIS). Established in 
the Spring of 2006, the PEO ensures that programs maximize 
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value to the Navy by balancing cost with the capability 
delivered to the end user. PEO-EIS manages a portfolio of 
enterprise-wide IT programs designed to enable common 
business processes and provide standard IT capabilities to 
sailors and Marines and their support systems [39]. 
The NEN Program Office (PMW 205) was established in 
February 2011 to “manage the acquisition life cycle of the 
Navy’s enterprise-wide IT networks.” [39] PMW 205 is 
responsible for the three PORs that will be discussed in 
this section: 
The Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is the DON 
shore-based enterprise network in the continental United 
States and Hawaii, providing “a single integrated, secure 
IT environment for reliable, stable information transfer.” 
[39]  
OCONUS Navy Enterprise Network (ONE-Net) “evolved from 
the Base Level Infrastructure Information (BLII) 
Modernization Program in 2005. ONE-Net provides secure, 
seamless and global computer connectivity for the DON 
outside the continental U.S. (and Hawaii).” [39] 
NEN also provides program management of the NMCI 
Continuity of Services Contract (CoSC), a contract that 
extends the life of NMCI and ONE-Net and maintains network 
services during the Department’s transition to NGEN [39]. 
Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) “represents 
the continuous evolution of [DON] enterprise networks and 
will provide secure, net-centric data and services to the 
Navy and Marine Corps personnel.” [39] 
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1. NMCI – Navy Marine Corps Intranet  
Implemented in 2001, the NMCI architecture replaced 
the Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21) and 
Marine Corps Tactical Network (MCTN) architectures. This 
was in response to a 1999 SECNAV directive to DON CIO to 
integrate the Navy and Marine Corps networks [40]. 
According to SPAWAR’s website, NMCI “currently 
represents about 70 percent of all DON IT operations and is 
second only to the Internet in size.” It goes on to say 
that NMCI “revolutionized the way the DON operated in 
cyberspace in both classified and unclassified 
environments.” [41, 42] 
Similar to the primary benefit of COMPOSE, NMCI 
increased standardization in Navy and Marine Corps network 
operations. It also increased “data security, technical 
support and real-time communications” through the 
implementation of common hardware, software and OSs. These 
improvements resulted in “increased productivity, greater 
interoperability, and enhanced [IA] security.” [40] 
The CIO claims that NMCI significantly increased 
network security over its predecessors, thwarting thousands 
of unclassified intrusion attempts each month, blocking 
millions of spam messages, and detecting viruses [43]. A 
few of the primary reasons for this improved security were 
“eliminating points of entry; switching to multi-layered 
defense; and allowing for fielding of public key 
infrastructure (PKI) and smart cards.” [44] 
a. General Statistics: 
According to the PEO OIS [41], NMCI currently has:  
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• More than 810,000 users 
• 384,000 workstations and laptops in more than 
3,000 locations 
• More than 3.4 terabytes of data transported and 
124 million browser transactions per day 
• 38 classified and unclassified server farms 
• 28 micro-server farms 
• Four NOCs that provide redundancy and security 
for network information 
b. Continuity of Services Contract (CoSC) 
The NMCI contract expired on 30 September 2010. 
Just prior to expiration, the DON awarded the NMCI CoSC to 
Hewlett-Packard. NMCI CoSC provides a bridge between NMCI 
and NGEN and “ensures the seamless connectivity and 
security of NMCI.” [48] 
According to SPAWAR [41], NMCI CoSC: 
• “Provides IT services during the transition 
from the NMCI contract to the proposed 
[NGEN] solution  
• “Increases governmental technical authority 
and ownership over critical network 
operations and infrastructure  
• “Allows the DON to competitively procure 
network services that support enterprise IT 
goals, encouraging greater participation 
from the IT industry while ensuring 
continuity of services at the close of the 
NMCI contract.” [40] 
2. OCONUS Navy Enterprise Network (ONE-Net)  
ONE-Net evolved from the BLII Modernization Program in 
2005. It was a Navy-wide initiative to install a 
standardized, secure, global IT infrastructure to OCONUS 
Navy installations. ONE-Net was based on the NMCI 
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architecture and was designed to be interoperable with IT-
21, NMCI, and the GIG [39]. 
Oversight of ONE-Net is currently part of the NEN 
Program Office that manages the acquisition life-cycle of 
DON enterprise-wide IT networks [39]. 
ONE-Net delivered “comprehensive, end-to-end 
information and telecommunication services to OCONUS Navy 
shore commands by using a common computing environment for 
both the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNet) and Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet).” [39] It also standardized hardware and software 
and increased IA and network security, providing users with 
“access to an OCONUS e-mail directory, a standard e-mail 
address, and increased SIPRNET availability and remote 
access.” [45] 
ONE-Net is currently designated as government-owned 
and -operated and will continue to be so “until the network 
transitions to NGEN and adopts the NGEN operating model and 
support structure.” [46] 
3. Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN)  
NGEN represents the next evolution of DON enterprise 
networks and will supply secure IT infrastructure and 
services to the Navy and Marine Corps. NGEN will serve as 
the DON's replacement for NMCI and ONE-Net, and will 
provide enterprise network services, namely: secure, 
standardized, end-to-end, shore-based information 
technology capability for voice, video and data 
communications [41, 47]. 
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A primary benefit of the NGEN upgrade to NMCI will be 
the inclusion of IA enhancements capable of meeting 
evolving security requirements. SPAWAR’s years of 
experience with NMCI will guide NGEN’s implementation 
process. The NGEN Acquisition Strategy also imitated the 
segmented approach recommended by Fortune 500 CIO best 
practices for IT, “acquiring IT services via the 
competitive award of multiple contracts for local 
transport, hardware, software and enterprise services.” 
[40]  
DON CIO is looking to NGEN to provide the Navy and 
Marine Corps improved access to the information and 
services that are necessary to accomplish the military’s 
mission in a Cyber Age. It also expects NGEN to provide a 
robust information system that will keep up with the pace 
of technological improvements [43].  
NGEN has begun the transition and implementation 
process for the Marine Corps and anticipates completion by 
May 2013. Transition of Navy networks will follow and is 
scheduled to be concluded by April 2014 [47]. 
DON CIO anticipates that NGEN:  
• “Will provide a 24/7 enterprise level service, 
with four NOCs and three enterprise service 
desks. 
• "Will be deployed to approximately 400,000 
workstations and laptops while creating nearly 
800,000 NGEN user accounts and serving more than 
3,000 locations in the continental United States, 
Hawaii, Alaska and Okinawa.” [47] 
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4. Summary 
This section provided information on DoN shore 
environments for the purpose of shedding light on their 
functionality, or in the case of NGEN, the expected system 
functionality.  
A program tool such as MAST must be capable of 
interoperating with NMCI, ONE-Net, and soon NGEN in order 
to be operational on shore facilities. For this reason, 
this section furnished basic information on these 
environments to the Testing Group to facilitate their 
understanding and knowledge of them. 
The following section discusses security and 
enterprise system management, most specifically HBSS. 
Individuals with a thorough understanding of this area may 
consider moving ahead to the Chapter III Conclusion.  
D. SECURITY AND ENTERPRISE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
This discussion is relevant to the Testing Group as it 
seeks to improve the understanding of existing DON 
procedures for dealing with vulnerabilities, threats, and 
potential exploits, and how policy compliance verification 
and remediation are accomplished. This is performed through 
a discussion of the tools and programs utilized to address 
these network concerns. 
Computer Network Defense Operating System Environment 
(CND-OSE) is the afloat CND suite that delivers the Host 
Based Security System (HBSS) and the Secure Configuration 
Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI) upon installation 
on a platform. The combination of these and their sub-
modules form the CND-OSE suite that is now part of the 
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COMPOSE load. This suite is loaded on every network that 
has COMPOSE, that is to say, every afloat platform’s 
network [48]. Computer Network Defense Information 
Assurance Suite (CND-IAS) is the shore-based alternative to 
CND-OSE and also includes HBSS. 
For clarity, the following definitions are provided: 
Vulnerability – “existence of a weakness, design, or 
implementation error that can lead to an unexpected and 
undesirable event compromising the security of the system.” 
[1] 
Threat – “An action or event that might compromise 
security. A threat is a potential violation of security.” 
[1]  
Exploits – “A defined way to breach the security of an 
IT system through a vulnerability.” [1] 
1. Intrusion Protection, Intrusion Detection, and 
Enterprise Network Security Solutions: HBSS 
HBSS is the DON enterprise network security solution 
POR for both afloat and ashore network enterprises. HBSS is 
being deployed by the DoD to provide security for Windows™ 
and Unix servers and workstations. A thorough discussion of 
HBSS is provided in Neff’s thesis [7], but HBSS is 
nonetheless revisited here, as the Testing Group will be 
testing MAST’s ability to interact with HBSS in order to 
function properly on DON networks. 
According to DISA, the primary goal of HBSS is to 
increase the level of trust with respect to DoD networks 
and the GIG [49]. HBSS can accomplish this through 
behavioral, signature, desktop-firewall, and application-
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blocking-protections. These remove vulnerabilities and 
harden DoD networks against threats and exploits. A general 
description of how HBSS modules perform these four tasks 
follows [48]: 
Behavioral rules are established to identify a profile 
of network activity. Departure from these rules results in 
a system alert [48]. 
The Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) is used to 
provide signature protection. This works as most standard 
virus protection software, crosschecking traffic against a 
database of signature rules to assess whether or not 
activity is malicious. Malicious activity detection 
triggers an alert (event) [48]. 
A firewall is used to filter between the host system 
and the network or Internet. All network traffic to and 
from the host is scanned at the packet level and compared 
against a list of firewall rules [48]. 
Finally, application blocking prevents the launching 
of certain executable files on the host system [48]. 
Pertinent to the MAST testing process is that HBSS and 
its McAfee Agent and modules, such as the electronic Policy 
Orchestrator (ePO) Server, HIPS, and Virus Scan Enterprise 
(VSE), (all discussed in greater detail in Neff’s thesis 
[7]) provide protection from threats and exploits (e.g. 
buffer overflow, DoS, and Trojan horse) through a variety 
of defense mechanisms to include detection, signature 
matching, and interception. A thorough description of the 
types of threats and exploits that exist are included in 
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several other MAST theses, principally those written by 
Taff and Salevski, Neff, and Longoria [6, 7, 9]. 
However, HBSS and its module complement are not alone 
sufficient to provide complete defense-in-depth for the 
vulnerabilities in a network. In fact, no amount of defense 
is able to maintain network health if good housekeeping 
procedures are not observed. These include such measures as 
keeping software versions up to date, loading patches as 
they become available, proper employment of firewalls, and 
proper configuration of intrusion detection and prevention 
systems. 
To monitor “good housekeeping”, DON utilizes the 
Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative, the 
Assured Compliance Assessment Solution, and the Intelligent 
Agent Security Module. These software tools are discussed 
in the following section. 
2. Policy Compliance Verification 
Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative 
is the current DON policy compliance verification tool for 
ship and shore systems. In the near future, DON expects to 
transition to the Assured Compliance Assessment Solution 
for sea and the Intelligent Agent Security Module for shore 
networks. 
a. Secure Configuration Compliance Validation 
Initiative  (SCCVI) 
The purpose of SCCVI is to monitor networks for 
secure configurations to discover vulnerabilities. To do 
this it checks system compliance with IAVA. Commercially 
known as eEye Digital Security’s Retina Network Security 
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Scanner, or simply  “Retina,” SCCVI is used to proactively 
detect and report network system vulnerabilities and to aid 
in the remediation of those vulnerabilities within DoD 
organizations [50, 51]. 
b. Assured Compliance Assessment Solution 
(ACAS) 
ACAS addresses the need for improvements in 
current DON vulnerability scanning capabilities. The ACAS 
Security Center provides the capabilities to allow for 
management, alerting, and reporting against vulnerability 
and compliance requirements [52].  
According to DISA, ACAS “provides automated 
network vulnerability scanning and configuration 
assessment, application vulnerability scanning, device 
configuration assessment, and network discovery.” [52] 
DISA's PEO-MA provides program management and is supporting 
the deployment of this capability. 
c. Intelligent Agent Security Module (IASM) 
The purpose of IASM is to perform “near real-time 
acquisition and normalization of security event logs and 
alerts from network and host sensors, firewalls, routers, 
and OSs; and to perform signature-based analyses of 
normalized events, allowing anomaly-based assessment of 
events, which generates alarms [for] unique security 
attacks.” [50] 
IASM performs network scanning to determine 
misuse, fraud, or attack. Data are analyzed and correlated 
utilizing multi-level IASM servers to create cyber attack 
profiles in near real-time. The technology “detects novel 
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non-signature attacks with cluster attack analysis and 
anomalous intrusion detection.” [53] 
3. Compliance Remediation 
One of the purposes of SCCVI is to help automate the 
remediation process, ensuring that noncompliant systems 
return to a secure configuration. This process is called 
“Compliance Remediation” and is performed via three 
methods: Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts, the 
Online Compliance Reporting System, and the Vulnerability 
Remediation Asset Manager. 
a. Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts 
(IAVA) 
An Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert is a 
notification generated when an IA vulnerability is 
discovered that can result in a threat to DoD networks and 
systems [54]. IAVAs are distributed to system 
administrators as they become available, dictating fixes 
that need to be made to systems based on newly identified 
vulnerabilities. It is then the system administrator’s 
responsibility to patch systems or make desired 
configuration changes [55]. 
The Information Assurance Vulnerability Manager 
(IAVM) is a program that comes with the COMPOSE load that 
pushes IAVA software onto each computer. It then manages 
system compliance with updates and patches required by an 
IAVA.  
Compliance reporting occurs in the Online Compliance 
Reporting System database [56]. 
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b. Online Compliance Reporting System (OCRS) 
The OCRS provides a Navy-wide IAVM database that 
is maintained by NCDOC. It is a program that tracks IAVA 
compliance of all platforms for the Navy. OCRS also follows 
IA Vulnerability Bulletins. The purpose of the system is to 
quickly disseminate vulnerability warnings directly to all 
network action officers and then to collect and track the 
vulnerability compliance reports from each Navy command 
[57]. 
c. Vulnerability Remediation Asset Manager 
(VRAM)  
The Vulnerability Remediation Asset Manager was 
developed as a complement to SCCVI. The SCCVI User Guide 
from December 2012 [51] describes VRAM as a “web-based 
interactive analysis tool and data repository for SCCVI 
scan data and Centrally Managed Programs/Programs of Record 
(CMP/POR) baseline vulnerability configuration 
information.” VRAM streamlines vulnerability management by 
providing a tool to monitor system vulnerabilities and to 
proactively maintain, validate, and document configurations 
[51].  
VRAM also provides network administrators the 
ability to assess their systems against a documented 
baseline. This allows a practical avenue for 
“identification and remediation of deviations from the 
approved configuration.” [51] 
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the quantitative testing 
environment, current testing and implementation methods, 
and criteria for cyber programs in the DoD and DON.  
Focusing on areas pertinent to the Testing Group, it 
began with an overview of five DoD range facilities: JCOR, 
JIOR, DoDIAR, NCR, and NCOR. It next furnished basic 
information on the shipboard environments, COMPOSE and 
CANES, followed by the shore environments, NMCI, ONE-Net, 
and NGEN, to facilitate the Testing Group’s understanding 
and knowledge of them. Finally, it concluded with a 
discussion of HBSS, SCCVI, and other PORs providing a brief 
look at DON procedures for dealing with vulnerabilities, 
threats, and potential exploits, and how policy compliance 
verification and remediation are accomplished.  
MAST must be able to operate in these hardware and 
software environments in order to meet its objectives as an 
effective training and evaluation tool for network 
operators and information security agents. The next chapter 
describes the test procedures that must be addressed by 
MAST in order to assure its ability to operate in the 
environments described above. 
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IV. QUANTITATIVE TESTING PROCESS 
This chapter opens with definitions of relevant terms 
and proceeds with the objectives and steps of the 
quantitative testing process for MAST. The steps in this 
procedure have been tailored specifically to suit MAST, and 
they are similar to the steps that would be used to place 
any piece of hardware or software on the PPL/SSIL (see 
Definitions). In addition to MAST itself, individual 
Simware modules and the kill switch’s system “roll back” 
ability will be tested. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
1. PPL/SSIL 
For any hardware or software to be used on a Navy 
network it must have received preapproval by the Navy 
through a testing process performed by SPAWAR. Items that 
have acquired this approval are listed in the Preferred 
Product List/System Subsystem Interface List (PPL/SSIL). 
These items range from hardware such as a Dell Computer or 
an iPhone, to software applications such as the Microsoft 
Office Package.  
2. Simulated-Malware (Simware) Module 
This is the portion of MAST Software that specifically 
simulates malicious activity. Simware modules run on client 
machines. The Scenario Execution Server sends parameters to 




Figure 9.  Simware Module Execution Processes. From [7]. 
Simware modules (referred to as “scenarios” in Figure 
9) are the piece of MAST that affects the client machines. 
The effects can be visible to the user, such as throwing up 
a new window, or invisible, such as port scanning or 
pinging [14]. 
3. Kill Switch 
The kill switch instantly stops all active and running 
processes associated with MAST on the server and client and 
executes return/reset of the network to its original state 
prior to running the Software or a Simware module, 
regardless of whether or not the Simware module scenario 
has completed. MAST returns to its idle state, but is not 
uninstalled from the client or server computers [14].  
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4. Roll Back 
Part of the kill switch function that returns/resets 
the network to its original state after any termination, 
whether due to kill switch activation or Simware module 
scenario completion (as determined by local network 
administrators or predetermined by system architects). MAST 
returns to its idle state, but is not uninstalled from the 
client or server computers [14]. 
B. OVERARCHING OBJECTIVES OF THE TESTING PROCESS  
There are two overall objectives for the quantitative 
testing process. The first is to ensure that when the MAST 
Software (hereafter referred to as “the Software”) is 
loaded on a network and in an idle state, it does not 
interfere with, disable, or otherwise negatively impact 
that network. Additionally, when the Software is actively 
running a Simware module on the network, this process will 
ensure that only specific, previously delineated, and pre-
determined negative behaviors are observed.  
The second objective is to verify the operation of the 
kill switch, demonstrating that upon its use, it 
successfully returns the network to its normal, operational 
state (that prior to running a Simware module) without 
interfering with, disabling, or otherwise negatively 
impacting the network on which it is installed.  
The following step-by-step procedure is meant to 
demonstrate that the Software can function on a network in 
accordance with the objectives and to ensure 
interoperability with the network. This is specifically 
different from demonstrating the functionality of MAST, 
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which has already been demonstrated. The purpose of this 
chapter is to define the testing process for MAST as it is 
loaded on a network in an idle and active state, and to 
define acceptable parameters (i.e., what is meant by a 
successful or a passing test) for MAST when it is both in 
idle mode and executing Simware modules. 
The first section of this chapter discusses items that 
must be considered prior to loading MAST onto a range or 
testing environment and before any testing can take place. 
The second section defines the testing process by 
objective, followed by detailed step-by-step procedures. 
This includes identifying the item being tested; the 
process or function the item is expected to run, execute or 
demonstrate; and the criteria for successful completion of 
each test. This testing process is patterned after a draft 
plan proposed by a non-attributable source [58]. 
C. PRIOR TO TESTING 
Prior to the operational range testing of MAST, a 
comprehensive list shall be created that identifies all 
services and processes needed for MAST operation. This list 
must identify the infrastructure-provided services MAST 
requires for it to be loaded onto a network and properly 
operate. It must also include additional program or access 
requirements that will be necessary for testing.  
Specific examples of items and services to be 
determined and allocated or provided prior to loading, 
operating, and testing are as follows: 
• What hardware is required? 
• Number and types of servers required 
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• Number of clients required 
• What software is required?  
• OS version or versions 
• Applications 
• Anti-Virus functionalities 
• What services and processes are required on 
the server 
• What services and processes are required on 
the local client 
• Specific programs or browsers  
• What level of connectivity is required, 
internally and externally, if any? 
• Is the test to be performed on a routed 
network or a local segment? 
• What administrative accesses are required, if 
any? 
• Are there security settings in place that must be 
changed or that must be put in place in order to 
test MAST? 
Hardware or software that is necessary to accomplish 
these testing objectives (aside from MAST itself) should be 
limited to items on the PPL/SSIL. This serves the practical 
purpose of minimizing the administrative overhead for 
follow-on tests on operational platform’s networks.  
Furthermore, in the case of simulation of a shipboard 
environment to accommodate a shipboard-fielding plan, the 
version of ISNS that is loaded in the test environment must 
be considered. This will mitigate unexpected installation, 
integration, and interoperability risks arising after the 
testing process has already completed.  
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The OS or Systems should be identified to ensure 
compliance with all varieties on different platforms (e.g., 
Unix, multiple variations of Windows, or other). 
Prior to the operational range testing of Simware 
modules, a comprehensive list shall be created that 
thoroughly identifies the malicious activity to be 
simulated by each Simware module (hereafter referred to as 
“the Parameters”). The Parameters shall define the 
malicious activities that will be demonstrated and describe 
how these behaviors will be identifiable in the test 
network. This will ensure characteristics that are 
demonstrated are limited to those expected per each Simware 
module’s specific design. 
For example, in the case of a Simware module built to 
exhibit the behaviors and signatures of a worm propagating 
on the network, the Parameters would describe what effects 
would be present though not necessarily visible (e.g., port 
scans), and it would also describe what the visible 
indicators of this activity are, in this case, an increase 
in benign traffic traversing the network.  
Examples of other possible indicators the Parameters should 
reference are expected increases in CPU usage for servers 
or clients, and specific defects or disruptions that are 
expected. 
D. TEST PROCEDURE 
Objective 1: Establish the configuration of the 
network at the range on which testing will occur – The 
following steps of the testing procedure apply to the 
installation of MAST on the testing range. They are meant 
 69 
to ensure PPL/SSIL baseline compliance for equipment and 
software utilized in the testing process.  
Step 1.1: Produce a step-by-step re-configuration 
for the range that will accommodate the Software.  
Criteria for success = comprehensive, easily 
understood procedure can be safely completed by testers 
and/or range personnel.  
Step 1.1.1: Verify that the step-by-step network 
re-configuration procedures are architecturally acceptable 
and follow a logical order. Verify that no steps are 
skipped; no steps are assumed by default; and that all 
automatic or requested system reboots are noted. 
Step 1.2: Produce step-by-step MAST configuration 
procedures for range installation.  
Criteria for success = comprehensive, easily 
understood procedure can be safely completed by testers 
and/or range personnel. 
Objective 2: MAST Operational Verification - The 
original testing requirements call for the completion of 
SOVT-like checks requested by the PPL/SSIL developer or 
sponsor. A System Operational Verification Test (SOVT) is 
an operational test of equipment performed after 
installation or modification on a Navy platform.  
Since the Software is in its initial testing phase, 
post-installation or –modification testing will not be 
discussed at this time. 
Objective 3: Software Compatibility Checks – The 
following steps of the testing process apply when the 
Software is installed on network servers or clients.  
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Step 3.1: Inspect Application, Security, and 
System Event Viewers on each affected host before and after 
installation of the Software.  
Criteria for success = no defects. 
Step 3.2: Identify and verify critical services 
and processes on the Primary Domain Controller (PDC) before 
and after installation of the Software.  
Criteria for success = no service disruptions. 
Step 3.3: Identify and verify critical services 
and processes on the alternate (Backup) Domain Controller 
or Controllers, if applicable, before and after 
installation of the Software.  
Criteria for success = no service disruptions. 
Step 3.4: Identify and verify critical services 
and processes on the Exchange Server before and after 
installation of the Software.  
Criteria for success = no service disruptions. 
Step 3.5: Identify and verify critical services 
and processes on the Management Server before and after 
installation of the Software.  
Criteria for success = no service disruptions. 
Step 3.6: Identify and verify critical services 
and processes on any additional servers before and after 
installation of the Software.  
Criteria for success = no service disruptions. 
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Step 3.7: Identify and verify critical services 
and processes on each affected client before and after 
installation of the Software.  
Criteria for success = no service disruptions. 
Step 3.8: Identify and verify file, registry 
setting, or other setting additions and changes made during 
installation of MAST (to include its Simware modules) and 
any security vulnerabilities that were potentially 
introduced. Running an accredited vulnerability scan (i.e., 
a Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative 
product such as Retina©) before and after loading MAST will 
expose vulnerabilities introduced by MAST to the network, 
if any.  
Criteria for success = no new Medium or High 
vulnerabilities. 
Step 3.9: Verify that the Microsoft Suite (Word, 
Excel, Access, PowerPoint, Outlook and Internet Explorer) 
Application will function after installation of the 
Software. Criteria for success = no defects. 
Step 3.10: In the event that errors, defects, or 
disruptions are discovered while accomplishing test steps 
3.1 to 3.9, they must be recorded or documented in detail.  
Provide a detailed description, and if possible, 
explanation of errors, defects, or disruptions. 
Step 3.10.1: Upon completion of steps 3.1 – 3.7 
(and any additional testing identified in steps 3.10.3 and 
3.10.4 if applicable), each step will be repeated to 
analyze the same entity or function before and after 
running Simware modules. 
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Criteria for success = defects or service 
disruptions limited to those predetermined in the 
Parameters for each individual Simware module. 
Step 3.10.2: Following the completion of the 
actions defined in step 3.10.1, each step will be repeated 
to analyze the same entity or function before and after 
activation of the kill switch, as applicable.  
Criteria for success = Simware module 
functionality as described in the Parameters must cease 
completely. All active or running processes associated with 
MAST shall end and the network shall return to its state 
prior to running a Simware module. MAST returns to its idle 
state, but has not been uninstalled from the network. 
Step 3.10.3: Additional to be determined (TBD) 
inspection and testing on the service or application 
related to the errors, defects, or disruptions identified 
in 3.10 may be performed.  
Criteria for success = TBD. 
Step 3.10.4: Perform any additional inspections 
or checks that are requested by MAST’s developer or 
sponsor, or required by the test environment.  
Criteria for success = TBD.  
Objective 4: Host Resource Usage – The following steps 
of the testing process apply to the interoperation of MAST 
with the server or client(s). 
Step 4.1: Identify the amount of disk space 
consumed by MAST.  
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Criteria for success = MAST utilizes less than or 
equal to 500 Megabytes. 
Step 4.2: Inspect the percentage of CPU usage for 
all clients and the PDC and its alternate; the Exchange 
Server; Management Servers; and any other existing servers 
utilized for the testing process with and without the 
Software loaded.  
To test “with and without” here and henceforth 
indicates first establishing the baseline without the 
Software loaded, and then checking the difference after 
loading the Software. 
Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in CPU usage for each client or server. 
Step 4.3: Inspect the amount of pages per second 
on all clients and the PDC and its alternate; the Exchange 
Server; Management Servers; and any other servers utilized 
for the testing process with and without the Software 
loaded.  
Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in amount of pages per second on each client or 
server. 
Step 4.4: Inspect the amount of disk input/output 
on all clients and the PDC and its alternate; the Exchange 
Server; Management Servers; and any other servers utilized 
for the testing process with and without the Software 
loaded.  
Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in disk input/output on each host. 
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Step 4.5: Inspect the amount of network adapter 
use on all clients and the PDC and its alternate; the 
Exchange Server; Management Servers; and any other servers 
utilized for the testing process with and without the 
Software being operated.  
Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in network adapter use on each client/server. 
Step 4.6: Inspect the amount of Active Directory 
database queries on the PDC and its alternate server with 
and without the Software loaded.  
Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in queries on each effected server. 
Step 4.7: Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) 
interaction. Steps 4.7.1 – 4.7.3 of the testing process 
apply when MAST interoperates with the HIDS. 
Step 4.7.1: HIDS and MAST do not conflict during 
server startup/shutdown.  
Criteria for success = no defects. 
Step 4.7.2: Check the Site Protector console for 
new HIDS events. Document all new events for analysis and 
baseline tuning. 
Step 4.7.3: Check the rate at which new events 
occur. Indicate whether the occurrences are continuous, 
occur upon start-up, or are periodic. 
Step 4.8: In the event of test results that are 
Out-of-Limits (OOL) or the occurrence of errors, defects, 
or disruptions while accomplishing test steps 4.1 to 4.7 
and all sub-steps, record or document each in sufficient 
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detail to allow post-test analysis. Provide a detailed 
description, and if possible, explanation of errors, 
defects, or disruptions. 
Step 4.8.1: Upon completion of steps 4.1 – 4.6 
(and any additional testing identified in steps 4.8.3 and 
4.8.4 if applicable), each step will be repeated to analyze 
the same entity or function before and after running 
Simware modules. 
Criteria for success = activity or process being 
observed for each client or server tested does not exceed 
level predetermined in the Parameters for each individual 
Simware module.  
Step 4.8.2: Following the completion of the 
actions defined in step 4.8.1, each step will be repeated 
to analyze the same entity or function before and after 
activation of the kill switch, as applicable.  
Criteria for success = Simware module 
functionality as described in the Parameters must cease 
completely. All active or running processes associated with 
MAST shall end and the network shall return to its state 
prior to running a Simware module. MAST returns to its idle 
state, but has not been uninstalled from the network. 
Step 4.8.3: Additional TBD inspection and testing 
on the service or application related to the OOL results or 
errors identified in 4.8 may be performed.  
Criteria for success = TBD. 
Step 4.8.4: Perform any additional inspections or 
checks that are requested by the Program developer or 
sponsor, or required by the test environment.  
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Criteria for success = TBD. 
Objective 5: Packet Transport Resource Usage – The 
following steps apply when the hosting network transports 
MAST packets. 
Step 5.1: Identify the amount of Backbone Layer-3 
transport device (switch or router) CPU usage that exists 
with and without the Software loaded.  
Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in CPU usage on each Backbone Layer-3 transport 
device. 
Step 5.2: Identify spanning tree re-convergence 
events on the Backbone Layer-2 switch or switches with and 
without the Software loaded.  
Criteria for success = no events. 
Step 5.3: Identify Virtual Router Redundancy 
Protocol re-convergence events on the Backbone Layer-3 
transport device (switch or router) with and without the 
Software loaded.  
Criteria for success = no events. 
Step 5.4: Identify Open Shortest Path First or 
other routing protocols utilized on the hosting network, 
re-convergence events on the Backbone Layer-3 transport 
device (switch or router) with and without the Software 
loaded.  
Criteria for success = no events. 
Step 5.5: Identify memory use on the Backbone 
device with and without the Software loaded.  
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Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in memory usage on each Backbone device. 
Step 5.6: Identify the amount of inter-network 
transport device traffic that is generated while the 
Software is operating normally.  
Criteria for success = less than or equal to 5% 
increase in inter-network transport device traffic. 
Step 5.7: In the event of test results that are 
OOL or the occurrence of errors, defects, or disruptions 
while accomplishing test steps 5.1 to 5.6, record or 
document each in sufficient detail to support post-test 
analysis.  
Provide a detailed description, and if possible, 
explanation of errors, defects, or disruptions. 
Step 5.7.1: Upon completion of steps 5.1 – 5.6 
(and any additional testing identified in steps 5.7.3 and 
5.7.4 if applicable), each step will be repeated to analyze 
the same entity or function before and after running 
Simware modules. 
Criteria for success = traffic, events, or usage 
being observed for each client or server tested does not 
exceed level predetermined in the Parameters for each 
individual Simware module.  
Step 5.7.2: Following the completion of the 
actions defined in step 5.7.1, each step will be repeated 
to analyze the same entity or function before and after 
activation of the kill switch, as applicable.  
Criteria for success = Simware module 
functionality as described in the Parameters must cease 
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completely. All active or running processes associated with 
MAST shall end and the network shall return to its state 
prior to running a Simware module. MAST returns to its idle 
state, but has not been uninstalled from the network. 
Step 5.7.3: Additional TBD inspection and testing 
on the service or application related to the OOL results or 
errors identified in 5.7 may be performed.  
Criteria for success = TBD. 
Step 5.7.4: Perform any additional inspections or 
checks that are requested by the Program developer or 
sponsor, or required by the test environment.  
Criteria for success = TBD.  
Objective 6: WAN (off-ship) Bandwidth Resource Usage – 
The following steps are applicable if MAST packets are 
transported to an off-site or simulated off-site location. 
Such traffic relay would be supported by organic Navy 
systems, such as ISNS or ADNS. However, such services might 
be provided by non-organic systems such as commercial 
satellite or non-government-off-the-shelf radio systems. 
Step 6.1: Ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship data 
communications, where applicable, should be Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) -based. User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
-based communications are not permitted with the exception 
of multicast applications.  
Criteria for success = all off-ship data 
communications are TCP-based, except where explicitly 
required. 
Step 6.2: Where applicable, if ship-to-shore and 
shore-to-ship Internet protocol IP data communications are 
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UDP versus TCP-based, how well do they co-exist with other 
present applications?  
Criteria for success = MAST throttles bandwidth 
demanded to a configurable rate. 
Step 6.3: When applicable, ship-to-shore and 
shore-to-ship IP data communications can be supported by an 
authorized and mandated proxy server.  
Criteria for success = application can be 
supported by Microsoft© proxy and/or Microsoft© ISA server. 
Step 6.4: If applicable, check Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS) interaction. Steps 6.4.1 – 6.4.3 of 
the testing process apply when MAST interoperates with the 
NIDS. 
Step 6.4.1: Check Site Protector console for new 
NIDS events. Document all new events for analysis and 
baseline tuning. 
Step 6.4.2: Determine the rate at which new 
events occur. Indicate whether the occurrences are 
continuous, occur upon start-up, or are periodic. 
Step 6.4.3: Annotate Ports and Protocols the test 
system uses for network communications. 
Step 6.5: In the event that errors, defects, or 
disruptions are discovered while accomplishing test steps 
6.1 to 6.4 and any sub-steps, record or document each in 
detail.  
Provide a detailed description, and if possible, 
explanation of errors, defects, or disruptions. 
 80 
Step 6.5.1: Upon completion of steps 6.1 – 6.4 
(and any additional testing identified in steps 6.5.3 and 
6.5.4 if applicable), each step will be repeated to analyze 
the same entity or function before and after running 
Simware modules. 
Criteria for success = traffic, events, or 
protocol being observed for each client or server tested 
does not exceed level predetermined in the Parameters for 
each individual Simware module. In addition, interaction 
with NIDS (if applicable) must be as was expected in 
Parameters. 
Step 6.5.2: Following the completion of the 
actions defined in step 6.5.1, each step will be repeated 
to analyze the same entity or function before and after 
activation of the kill switch, as applicable.  
Criteria for success = Simware module 
functionality as described in the Parameters must cease 
completely. All active or running processes associated with 
MAST shall end and the network shall return to its state 
prior to running a Simware module. MAST returns to its idle 
state, but has not been uninstalled from the network. 
Step 6.5.3: Additional TBD inspection and testing 
on the service or application related to the errors, 
defects, or disruptions identified in 6.5 may be performed.  
Criteria for success = TBD. 
Step 6.5.4: Perform any additional inspections or 
checks that are requested by the Program developer or 
sponsor, or required by the test environment.  
Criteria for success = TBD.  
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Objective 7: Uninstalling MAST – The following steps 
of the testing procedure are pertinent to the removal of 
MAST from the testing range. 
Step 7.1: Check that instructions follow a 
logical order, no steps are skipped, no steps are assumed 
by default, and all automatic or requested system reboots 
are noted.  
Criteria for success = no defects. 
Step 7.2: Verify that all MAST folders are 
deleted during the uninstall process.  
Criteria for success = all deleted. 
Step 7.3: Verify that any MAST components left on 
the system(s)are noted as to why they are not deleted.  
Criteria for success = all undeleted components 
are documented. 
Step 7.4: Verify that shared .dll and other 
system files that are not deleted at uninstall are noted.  
Criteria for success = all undeleted files noted. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the step-by-step quantitative 
testing process for MAST software to satisfy the primary 
objective of this research and answer the problem 
statement. In addition, testing processes for the kill 
switch and Simware modules, two critical functions of MAST, 
were defined. Chapter V discusses conclusions and our 
recommendations for the future of MAST, to include 
development of a Simware module template, implementation, 
and cost benefit analysis.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis provides a methodology for the testing 
phase of the roadmap for fielding MAST to support an 
installation decision. This phase in MAST’s development 
focuses on the quantitative testing at a DoD cyber range.  
The purpose of this thesis is to define a measurable 
set of procedures that satisfy our objectives stated in 
Chapter I, to wit, the quantitative testing process for 
MAST. Meeting this objective requires designing a suite of 
tests that definitively demonstrate the ability of MAST to 
perform securely on operational DoD networks.  
In addition to MAST’s core functionality, the testing 
process verifies the operations of the kill switch and 
Simware modules. Verification of the kill switch ensures 
that it restores the network to its previous configuration, 
placing MAST in an idle state where it exhibits no negative 
impact to the network. Simware modules are verified to 
ensure that when executed they replicate only the nefarious 
behavior that is expected.  
The set of measureable procedures developed for the 
quantitative testing include accomplishing the following 
sub-bullets for MAST before, during, and after interaction 
with an operating network (interoperability): 
• Establishing cyber testing range network 
configurations 
• Software compatibility checking 
• Verifying host resource usage while MAST is 
operating 
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• Verifying packet transport usage resources 
• Verifying off-ship/-site bandwidth resource usage 
• Establishing methodology for uninstalling MAST 
from a network  
These objectives are satisfied through the procedure 
laid down in Chapter IV. We have identified a step-by-step 
procedure, the following of which would perform a thorough 
and exhaustive, industry-standard testing of MAST and its 
Simware modules.  
Before executing the test procedure, the following 
will be required: 
• Knowledge of DoD range capabilities 
• Familiarity with ship and shore network 
environments  
• Understanding of Security and Enterprise System 
Management 
That being the case, the testing environment depicted 
in Chapter III is valuable for several reasons: it provides 
a singular location where information regarding this broad 
area of the cyber domain is collected, because necessary 
specialization in specific cyber niches and areas of 
expertise may leave some in the dark when it comes to 
entire swathes of the cyber testing environment. 
Furthermore, many are simply unfamiliar with much of the 
environment because of its staggering breadth relative to 
its young age.  
B. BENEFITS TO THE DON AND DOD 
The type of training MAST provides is most similar to 
what network administrators would experience during a 
penetration test by a Navy Red Team. Due to the low 
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availability of Red Teams and the cost associated with 
them, several NPS students endeavored to create a program 
that can perform as a Red Team, and meet the needs of the 
fleet in areas that Red Teams fall short, such as 
availability and cost [6, 7]. The implementation of MAST as 
a DON or DoD POR will provide the benefit of training 
network administrators in the recognition and removal of 
malware and malicious activities through the use of 
simulated malware, thus better enabling them to defend DoD 
networks [7]. 
This thesis has provided a procedure for testing MAST 
in order to facilitate its implementation process and 
provide the administrators of DON and DoD networks with a 
practical and useful tool to help them successfully defend 
their networks.  
C. FUTURE WORK 
1. Module Template Development  
There are security and practicality concerns involved 
in the creation of multiple Simware modules utilizing many 
different sets of coding and scripts. Specifically, it is 
impractical to return to the test range after the 
development of each individual Simware module, but this 
could be necessary for network security reasons. 
One solution is the creation of a module template. 
This could take the form of a program built into a GUI on 
which the network administrator can input general 
parameters for the type of malware they would like to 
simulate. The Testing Group could test such a model 
concurrently with MAST. 
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A module template allows for practical creation of 
Simware modules that meet user’s requirements. 
Additionally, creating Simware modules in the same general 
way would simplify security testing procedures, thus 
preventing MAST or the Simware modules from themselves 
becoming an attack vector. 
2. Focus on Fleet Implementation 
The need exists to provide MAST, a useful and 
necessary product, to DoD and DON network administrators in 
accordance with a timeline sufficiently advanced to meet an 
already existing threat.  
As it is currently constructed, MAST has great 
potential to provide improved training for DoD network 
administrators, and is directed at providing a network 
health management function. This includes utilization of 
MAST as a method of insuring proper network configuration 
of other PORs, primarily those concerned with network 
security, such as HBSS and HIPS. This affords the 
motivation for maintaining a narrowed focus to ensure 
concentration on program delivery.  
Following successful quantitative testing at a cyber 
range by the Testing Group, the next steps toward 
acceptance as a DON POR need to be taken for MAST to be 
adopted by DoD at large. This means operational testing on 
a platform at an exercise such as TRIDENT WARRIOR, or on a 
shore-based network or training environment, and 
installation on a platform in preparation for a battle 
group exercise (such as a COMPTUEX).  
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Individuals in the computer science or cyber fields of 
study who have experience in POR implementation are likely 
candidates to perform fleet testing. 
3. Cost Benefit Analysis 
There needs to be a supportability and sustainment 
plan for MAST. There also needs to be a defined fielding 
strategy that determines if MAST is cost effective through 
examination of factors such as sustainment and maintenance 
cost.  
A necessary part of implementation is the discovery of 
costs, e.g., maintenance costs, manpower costs, etc., to 
determine the benefits to using MAST over current 
solutions. These can be developed through a business case 
analysis that evaluates the potential economic benefit of 
MAST as compared to its closest comparable system and 
determines the logistical and financial barriers, 
requirements, and procedures involved in implementation.  
Performing a cost benefit analysis will quantify costs 
vs. savings and identify if MAST provides a net benefit to 
the DoD. Candidates for this research would be those in a 
business or logistics field of study with similar 
backgrounds. 
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APPENDIX. CYBER RANGE POINTS OF CONTACT 
JIOR - Captain John Moore, USN, is currently Chief, Joint 
IO Range Branch and Mr. Greg Sisson the Deputy Chief of 
JIOR gregory.sisson@js.smil.mil. 
 
JCOR - Mr. Tom May manages the JCOR as a whole, but each 
consortium member manages their own respective Service’s 
simulators. C. D. "SKI" Soltysik Csoltysik@camber.com at 
(618) 606-1604 is the Lead Cyber Exercise Planner. W. H. 
Dunn wdunn@camber.com at (850)896-5659 is the VP for Cyber. 
Mr. Tom May Thomas.may@us.af.mil at (618)229-6277, an Air 
Force civilian, manages the JCOR as a whole. 
 
DoDIAR - The procedures for connecting to the DoD 
Information Assurance Range can be obtained by contacting 
the Cyber Range Customer Management Team at 
IARangeCMT@itsfac.com. Jeffrey Combs jeffrey.combs@usmc.mil 
is the Program Manager for USMC C4 and the DoD Cyber IA 
Range. 
 
NCR – Todd Fisher coordinates NCR test events and can be 
contacted at todd.g.fisher@osd.mil. 
 
NCOR – LCDR Steven Calhoun Steven.C.Calhoun@navy.mil at 
(757)417-6720 x9 is the 10TH FLEET, N72 and manages the 
simulator, and James Powell is Lead Engineer for NCOR and 
can be contacted via email at James.A.Powell.ctr@navy.mil.  
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